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COMMENTS
JOINT AND MUTUAL WILLS*
I.

ACTIONS FOR BREACH OCCURRING WHILE BOTH PARTIES
ARE STILL ALIVE

Clearly the parties to a contract for the execution of a joint
and mutual will can, acting together, revoke such will and rescind
the contract without incurring any liability for breach, provided the
agreement did not create any rights in a third party beneficiary.1
There are conflicting decisions, however, in respect to the right of a
testator to revoke or revise the terms of his jointly executed will,
notwithstanding the existence of a valid contract between the parties,
during the lifetime of the other party, but without such other party's
consent. Logic supports the view that, assuming the other party has
lived up to the agreement, a revocation of the will by one of the
parties under such circumstances is a breach of contract irrespective
of whether the revocation is upon notice to the other party.2 There
is support, however, for the rule that a joint will, executed pursuant
to a contract, can be revoked by one party while the other is still
living without committing a breach of contract of which equity
will take cognizance to require specific performance, provided notice
of such revocation is given to the other party or he has acquired
3
knowledge of the revocation in some other manner.
The foregoing rule that permits a revocation of the will by either
party during the joint lives of the parties is, as observed from the
statement of the rule, ordinarily conditioned upon notice to the other
party. Moreover, there are authorities which directly support the
view that neither party is to be permitted to repudiate his contract
to make a joint will, by revoking his will drawn pursuant thereto,
in the absence of notice to the other party. 4 Such view is deemed
particularly pertinent where the testators are husband and wife. 5 It
has been held that the burden of proof on the issue of notice rests
upon the party who relies upon the revocation of the will, at least
where the proof is entirely in his control. 6 In other cases, however,
*The first installment of this article appears in 38 MARQ. L. REv. 30 (1954).
Stewart v. Todd, 190 Iowa 283, 173 N.W, 619, 180 N.W. 146, 20 A.L.R. 1272
(1919).
2Canada v. Ihmsen, 33 Wyo. 394, 240 P.927, 43 A.L.R. 1010 (1925).
3 Hale v. Campbell, 44 F.Supp. 772 (D.C. Iowa 1932) ; Kingsbury v. Kingsbury,
120 Misc.362, 198 N.Y.S. 512 (1923).
4 Wright v. Wright, 215 Ky. 394, 285 S.W. 188 (1926) ; Robinson v. Mandell,
3 Cliff.169, Fed. Cas. No. 11,959 (1868).
5 Curry v. Cotton, 356 111.538, 191 N.E. 307 (1934).
6 Ibid.
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the courts have said that the will may be revoked or rendered unenforceable, without a requirement that notice be given.
Full knowledge of the fact of revocation is the equivalent of notice,
or as sometimes stated, excuses the failure to give notice.8 Also
according to some authority, the surviving testator has no complaint
on the ground of lack of notice of the revocation by the other testator,
where such revocation was accomplished by a later will of which
the survivor obtained knowledge on the other's death. This on the
theory that the survivor, having the opportunity to revoke his own
will upon being thus advised that the other party had revoked his,
is not prejudiced by reliance upon the contract executed by the parties.9
Whether joint testators, who have not revoked their wills, are restricted from disposing of their property during their respective
lifetimes is a question primarily of the construction of the agreement
under which the will or wills were executed. It may be stated generally
that the courts do not consider that the parties to a joint will intended
to restrict either from disposing of property in good faith 0 by transfers effective during his or her lifetime, unless a plain intention to
this effect is expressed in the will or in the contract pursuant to
which it was executed."- In general, no such restriction exists where,
under the contract and will executed pursuant thereto, each testator
designates the property to be devised as that belonging to him at the
2
time of his death.1
If a third person, who has received property in a gift effected
by the deceased joint testator during his lifetime in violation of the
right of the surviving party, has converted it to his own use so that
it may not be delivered in kind to the surviving party, the latter will
be entitled to full compensation in an action for damages.' 3 A contract
between husband and wife by which they undertake respectively
to bequeath a specified property to each other so that it shall vest in
the survivor during his lifetime and shall then vest in and belong
to a third person, is not necessarily breached by the subsequent execution of separate wills wherein the spouses bequeath such property
directly to the third person. 14 The expression of a desire to rescind
is immaterial where wholly unexecuted, at least immaterial after the
7 Gould v. Mansfield, 103 Mass. 408, 4 Am. Rep. 573 (1869); Peoria Human Soc.
8 v. McMurtrie, 229 Ill. 519, 82 N.E. 319 (1907).
Lolly v. Cronen, 247 N.Y. 58, 159 N.E. 723 (1928).
9 Supra, note 2.
10 See Sparks, Legal Effect of Contracts to Devise or Bequeath, 53 MIcH. L.
Rav. 1 (1954) on the question of what constitutes good faith.
"Rastetter v. Hoenninger, 214 N.Y. 66, 108 N.E. 210 (1915).
12 Sample v. Butler University, 217 Ind. 122, 4 N.E.2d. 545, 5 N.E.2d. 888, 108

A.L.R. 857 (1937).
v. Wright, supra, note 4.
1'Getchell v. Tinker, 291 Mich. 267, 289 N.W. 156 (1939).

:'3 Wright
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survivor has accepted the benefits of the deceased party's will executed
15
pursuant to the contract.
II.

BREACHES OCCURRING IN THE WILL OF THE FIRST TO DIE

Vivos ACTS OF SURVIVOR
Where a party to a contract to make joint wills commits a breach
of the contract by executing a new will with provisions different from
the original contract, the survivor, upon proof of continued performance thereof, in good faith, on his or her part, is entitled to
specific performance as against any heirs, devisees, legatees or execu16
tor under the breaching or revoking will of the deceased testator.
It can also be said that equity will not permit one of the parties to
rescind the contract by his own act in conveying the property,
contrary to the terms of their agreement, after the death of the
other party.' 7 In point of time, these are the only two types of breach
that can be considered when only one of the parties is still alive.
An interesting problem is suggested by the rule that a devise
or legacy bequeathed to a person individually and not jointly with
others lapses upon the death of the donee in the lifetime of the testator,
unless the testator has indicated a contrary intent or a statute changes
the result.' Applying such principle to our joint will situation, nothing
would pass under the will of the survivor of the joint testators who
have executed wills by which each devised and bequeathed to the
other all of his property, since the bequest to the first testator to die
lapsed upon his death. The problem is important here because it could
be offered as a defense, by the estate of the survivor, in an action
for a breach allegedly perpetrated by the survivor. Statutes have
been enacted in many jurisdictions designed to prevent, under certain
circumstances, the application of the rule by providing that in such
contingency, the heirs or issue of the deceased donee shall take in
the absence of the testator's intention to the contrary. The problem
ordinarily arises where the wills are those of husband and wife and
one of the spouses has died leaving his entire estate to the other. The
question then is whether, upon the death of the latter, the heirs or
issue of the former will take the entire estate under the statute as
heirs of a donee whose death has preceded that of the testator.
According to some authority, joint wills making no provision for a
third person, either absolute or conditioned upon the death of both
testators in a common disaster, constitute in effect a single will, being
the will of the first to die, and have no existence as the will of the
AND BY INTER

25 Allen v. Ross, 199 Wis. 162, 225 N.W. 831, 64 A.L.R. 180 (1929).
16 Supra, note 4.
17 Carmichael v. Carmichael, 72 Mich. 74, 40 N.W. 173 (1888).
18 Hoermann's Estate, 234 Wis. 130, 290 N.W. 608 (1940); Cleaver v. Cleaver,
39 Wis. 96, 20 Am. Rep. 30 (1875).
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surviving testator. 19 In other words, the rights of the one testator in
the estate of the other are made to depend solely upon his or her
surviving the other.2 0 The property of the first testator to die passes
to the surviving testator and upon the death of the latter, without
having executed a second will in the meantime, the property passes
to his or her heirs as intestate property. The view is that an antilapse
statute raising the presumption that a testator intends his bequest to
go to the heirs of the devisee in case the devisee predeceases him,
in the absence of a contrary intent shown in the will, does not apply so
as to permit the heirs of the testator who died first to take under
the will of the testator whose death occurred later, since there is in
reality no will to which the statute can apply. 21 To say that it was
intended that the agreement was to bind the survivor by his own will,
so as to permit his estate to pass to the heirs at law and distributees
of the first to die, to the exclusion of his own next of kin, is to reach
a result which is unnatural and unreasonable. It is apparent that this
latter view overrides the parties' express intention to make joint wills.
No Wisconsin decision has been found on this exact point.
The surviving testator is under an irrevocable obligation upon the
death of the other party testate, where the agreement of the two testators created rights in third party beneficiaries, at least where the
survivor accepts the benefits of the provisions of the will, of the other
contracting party, in his favor.22 In some cases it has been held that,
if the survivor threatens to dispose of property in violation of the
provisions of the will, he can be enjoined from doing so at the instance
of one who would be prejudiced thereby. To this effect is an Iowa
case 23 in which an injunction was granted restraining the survivor
from making other dispositions of her land by deed or will. Having
accepted the property of the deceased testator on his death, the court
held that the survivor was estopped from disposing of the property
contrary to the agreement. All Wisconsin cases on this point stress
the fact that benefits have- been accepted by the survivor. 24 The issue
presents itself as to what the effect of this language would be in a
case where, for instance, a surviving wife elects to take against the
joint will. In such a situation she could not be accepting benefits under
her husband's will. Is this a method of getting around the restrictions
of a joint will when the husband dies first? Stated another way,
will equity act only when the surviving wife has accepted benefits
29

Maurer v. Johansson, 223 Iowa 1102, 274 N.W. 99 (1937), construing IOWA

CODE §11,861.
Wilson v. Starbuck, 116 W.Va. 554, 182 S.E. 539 (1935).
Supra, note 19.
22
Smith v. Thompson, 250 Mich. 302, 230 N.W. 156, 73 A.L.R. 1389 (1930).
23 Campbell v. Dunkelberger, 172 Iowa 385, 153 N.W. 56 (1915).
24 Doyle v. Fischer, 183 Wis. 599, 605, 198 N.W. 763 (1924), Allen v. Ross, 199
Wis. 162, 225 N.W. 831 (1929).
20
21
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under the will of her husband? No cases have been found on this
point.
III. AcTioNs OCCURRING BECAUSE OF SURVIVOR'S WILL
An agreement to make joint wills for the benefit of third persons
is in effect a contract to bequeath or devise property at the death
of the promisor and should be so construed.2 5 But a release by a
third party beneficiary under a joint will, whereby such beneficiary
purports to discharge all claims against the surviving testator, constitutes a defense to an action alleging breach by execution of a new
will, by the estate of the surviving testator, at least where the bene26
ficiary had knowledge of the contract when he executed the release.
There is some authority to the effect that a claimant, under a contract
by his father and mother to make joint wills benefiting claimant, might
be estopped from claiming under the contract by his act in petitioning
for the appointment of an administrator of his father's estate as an
intestacy.27 Such view, however, was apparently based on the particular facts that claimant had no training in the law and had been advised
by the probate judge that a subsequent marriage by the surviving
father was a revocation of the will of the survivor. In reality, it does
not seem that claimant's action in that case was inconsistent with
his rights to claim benefits under the contract.
It has been held by some courts that a subsequent marriage of
a surviving testator, although operative under the statute of the
jurisdiction to revoke his will, does not relieve him from the obligation
of the contract or prevent its enforcement in equity when he dies
leaving a new will, 28 especially where the contracting parties were
husband and wife and the agreement was entered into for the purpose
of providing for the children of each of them by prior marriages.2 9
The second wife of a surviving testator, who had executed a will
jointly with his first wife and subsequently executed a new will,
stands in no better position than her husband, and is estopped to
abrogate the agreement after the husband has secured the probate
of the will as the will of his first wife and has accepted the benefits
thereof, where the facts within her knowledge at the time she
contracted the marriage were sufficient to give her notice or put
her upon inquiry respecting the rights of third-party beneficiaries. 30
It has also been held that the surviving testator can be held to the
terms of the joint will only insofar as he or she is bound by the
contract; and if a third-party beneficiary has received, prior to the
25 Zabel v.Stewart, 153 Kan. 272, 109 P.2d 177 (1941).
26 McWhorter v. Humphreys, 161 S.W.2d. 310 (1942).
27 Mosloski v. GAmble, 191 Minn. 170, 253 N.W. 378 (1934).

Ralyea v. Menners, 155 Misc. 539, 280 N.Y.S. 8 (1934).
29 Ibid.
3OLarrabee v. Porter, 166 S.W. 395 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914).
28
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death of the survivor that to which he was entitled under the joint
will, he can have no complaint of which the law vwill take cognizance
concerning the dispositions made, by the surviving testator in a new
will, of other property received by the latter under the provisions of
the joint will.31 Where the testator last surviving has the power, under
a contract to make a joint wills, to determine the distribution to be
made of a portion of the combined estates within a class of beneficiaries, executes a will for that purpose and later revokes it, the
revoked will is without effect in determining who are to take as
beneficiaries upon the enforcement of the contract in equity.32 If the
testatrix last surviving dies without exercising further the power
thus vested in her to determine tthe distribution, the court will exercise
it for her on the basis of equality, but not of literal equality, among
the members of the class, where the class is described as "next of
kin" in the contract and the general policy of the state as stated in
the statute on distribution of a decedent's estate calls for a division
33
per stirpes among next of kin.

IV.

REMEDIES FOR BRAcH

The breach of a contract for the joint execution of a will should
give rise to the same remedies as are employed in other cases of
breach of contract to make a will, namely, an action at law for
damages, and a suit in equity.3 4 But, it is to be observed that the
latter is the type of relief usually invoked.3 5 In fact, according to some
authorities, only a court of equity can take cognizance of an allegation
that the revocation of a joint will by the surviving testator was in
violation of his contract with the deceased testator.3 6 Ordinarily
however, the executor or administrator of the estate of the survivor
is a necessary party to the enforcement of the contract.3 7
The usual remedy is not in the contest of the probate of the will
which constitutes the violation of which complaint is made,38 since, in
the absence of a statute giving the probate court equity powers, the
main issue on a contested probate is whether the paper compounded
is the last will of the decedent.3 9 The probate court, whose jurisdiction
at this stage is limited to the determination of such issue, lacks power
to enforce an agreement between the two testators. 40 Nor can such
3' 169 A.L.R. 49.
32 169 A.L.R. 37.
33 Ibid.
34 Curry v. Cotton, stepra note 5.
35 28 HARV. L. REv. 215.
36 Re Rolls, 193 Calif. 594, 226 P.606 (1924) ; Re Harris, 9 Calif. 2d. 694, 72 P.2d.

873 (1937).

37 French v. French, 148 S.W.2d. 930 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941).

38 Re Sandburg, 75 Misc. 38, 134 N.Y.S. 869 (1911).

39 Chitwood v. Collins, 122 W.Va. 267, 8 S.E.2d. 830 (1940).
40

Clements v. Jones, 166 Ga. 738, 144 S.E. 319 (1928).
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jurisdiction be conferred by the consent of the parties. 41 The proper
procedure would seem to require that claimant file his claim in fhe
probate court, and at the same time start his action in equity to
determine his rights under the contract. Most courts have held that
the establishment of a trust for the purpose of enforcing a contract
such as this is not ordinarily within the jurisdiction of the probate
court.4 '

Beneficiaries under joint wills have available the remedy

of specific performance. 43 But, where the contract has been violated
by the revocation of a will drawn in pursuance of the agreement,
and the property has been converted so that delivery in kind cannot
be made, equity may award damages in lieu of specific performance. 4
A decree probating the revoking will is not res judicata as to issues
arising under the contract, but according to some authority, the
revoking will must be probated before a suit to enforce specific
45
performance of the agreement will be entertained.
Equity has adopted the expedient of declaring and enforcing
a trust, in property received under the agreement by one of the
parties who has violated the contract by revoking his will, for the
persons entitled thereto under such contract. 46 Property in the hands
of takers with notice of the first will, or in the hands of volunteers,
is also impressed with a trust and may be subjected to the payment
of compensatory damages to the other party to the contract.47 A
declaration of a trust will not be refused on the ground that the survivor of the testators, who violated the contract, has a larger personal
estate than he received from the testator first to die, since a trustee is
not permitted to convert trust funds on the chance that upon his
death his personal estate may be sufficient to reimburse the trust
estate. 48 Also, where a husband and wife made joint wills with an
agreement that the survivor would bequeath the property received
from the other to the heirs of the one dying first, the parents of the
wife, who died first, as her heirs, were held entitled to establish a
trust in the property after her death, at least in situations where the
survivor is not acting in good faith.49 A further remedy has been
suggested by some authorities which gives support to the position that
an injunction against the probate of a later will, which was executed
by the survivor of the parties in violation of the agreement, will b:
granted to prevent a cloud on title. 50
Fuller v. Nelle, 12 Cal. App.2d. 576, 55 P.2d. 1248 (1936).
Tracy v. Donzinger, 249 App. Div. 46, 291 N.Y.S. 113 (1936).
43 Doyle v. Fischer, 183 Wis. 599, 198 N.W. 763 (1924).
44Wright v. Wright, supra note. 4.
4SAllen v. Bromberg, 147 Ala. 317. 41 So. 777 (1906).
46 Allen v. Ross, 199 Wis. 162, 225 N.W. 831 (1921).
478 Curry v. Cotton, supra note 5.
4 Rastetter v. Hoennminger, supra note 11.
492 A.L.R. 1200.
59 Child v. Smith, 225 Iowa 1205, 282 N.W. 316 (1938).
41
42
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The question of proper or necessary parties in an action to enforce
the contract, in most cases found, involves third persons either as
third-party beneficiaries or persons claiming under such contract. As
stated above, the executor or administrator is usually a necessary party.
A child who is a beneficiary under the will of his brother, and
has obtained title to property devised by it, has been held to have a
sufficient interest to enable him to maintain an action to enforce
an agreement between his father and mother to make joint wills
naming the deceased brother a beneficiary. 51 And while it may be
generally stated that equity will not proceed for the enforcement of
such a contract at the instance of one who has only a nominal right
thereunder, it has been held that a creditor of a third-party beneficiary
52
has a sufficient interest.
V.

CONCLUSION

It would appear that much of the litigation over joint wills could
be avoided if proper attention is given by the scrivener to the
contractual aspect. The approach to the task of drafting the will
or wills should be made by ascertaining whether the prospective testators are agreed that the testamentary dispositions are to be made
beyond the power to revoke unilaterally. The ordinary testator, being
untrained in law, does not realize, in the absence of good legal
counsel, the full significance of a contract to make wills with mutual
and reciprocal provisions. Too often has the surviving testator
learned to his regret at a late date that by reason of having obligated
himself to keep his will in effect, it is beyond his power to benefit
those persons who, under the circumstances of caring for him in his
declining years, should receive the benefit of his testament.
HAROLD AUSTIN DALL,

51 Doyle v. Fischer, supra note 45.
52

Morgan v. Sanborn, 225 N.Y. 454, 122 N.E. 696 (1919).

LL. B.

